Latest from PLAN

It looks like the first Luda (105) has recently been decommissioned. It's kind of interesting that this decommissioned destroyer is actually even smaller than 054A. Quite good to see that China's classification of vessel sizes has finally begun to match the international level. Anyhow, we saw some photos of HP shipyard recently, looks like the second 054A in HP is almost ready to join a fleet somewhere. The first 054A on both HD and HP are already serving in SSF as 569 and 570. Same with 071, which is recently named as the KunLunShan class.


Also, looks like the 3rd 054A at HP might be a bit away. They are building a new dock in HP shipyard. The next 054A might not start until the dock is finished. I guess they are saving money for the carrier project.
Speaking of which, there are some rumours recently that the carrier projects will start in both Dalian and Shanghai shipyards. I'm not surprised that two will be built, but I didn't think Dalian would get any work. Also, the cost was put at 30 billion RMB each, so around 4 billion USD. I'm not sure what this includes (ie: R&D cost or not). They are supposedly looking for something that is 60k+ in standard displacement, 317 m long, 70+ m wide and can carry 55+ aircrafts (of which 30+ J-11Cs, some number of helicopters and possibly Y-7 AEWs) I know 4 billion is cheaper US carriers, but this one is smaller than CVN-77 and uses older technology. Another thing is that Chinese ships are just cheaper to build. For example, each 054A only costs 1.58 billion RMB and each 022 only costs about 100 million RMB. At this point, I'd generally take the cost rumours with a grain of salt. However, the carrier dimensions is from a much better source and seems to be comparable to Varyag dimensions (although a little larger). I do expect to see catapults on the first generation of Chinese carriers. Otherwise, beginning Y-7 AEW development at this time frame simply does not make sense. So, hopefully we will start seeing some pictures coming out for carrier construction late next year.

A tad more on 054A

Just found some interesting tidbits on PLAN CIWS while reading up on some sources. Seems as if China had evaluated Kashtan as early as 1992. Somehow, it was not overly impressed by certain part of Kashtan like its system reaction time and muzzle velocity. Despite the greater rate of fire of Kashtan, Goalkeeper and Seamos were preferred in the two area that probably improves engagements vs supersonic sea-skimmers. We've seen pictures like this indicating that China is developing a Kashtan-like system:

Clearly, they do appreciate the concept of mixing short ranged SAM with CIWS. However, the performance of both the gun and the missile must be satisfactory against fast low altitude missiles. We see a system like LD-2000 in service for the army, but no such system for the navy. Why? The army is encountering helicopters, low flying aircrafts and subsonic missiles. TY-90 can encounter those, but it can't encounter something like Brahmos.

Now, back to Type 730 CIWS. Interestingly enough, it uses different fire control system than Goalkeeper and Seamos. Goalkeeper uses one radar to search and another radar to do the engagements. Seamos uses Infrared seeker to do search and TV tracking camera to do the engagements. By comparison, I believe Kashtan uses one radar to search and engages with radar or TV tracker. Type 730 combined the strength of Goalkeeper and Seamos by using TR-47C to do searching and using the combination of TV tracking camera, infrared tracking camera and laser rangefinder to do the engagement guidance. It is certainly not cheap to add all these extra "eyes" to the system, but certainly makes the tracking/engagement of Type 730 better than the other two.

As for the reaction time, this is what is stated on the official site for Kashtan -> 6 to 8 seconds. That makes sense since the reaction of Tunguska-M is stated to be around 8 seconds. The Chinese sources were using 6.5s to 7 for the reaction time of Kashtan. Goalkeeper on the other hand, has a reaction time of 5.5s vs supersonic missiles. Type 730 should be around 5.5s too.

The other interesting question that has been asked is why 054 uses 4 AK-630M instead of 2 Type 730. From all evidences, each Type 730 should be stronger than 2 AK-630M. The reasons often stated are cost and putting familiar weapon system on a new hull. Another reason that was brought up is that 054 simply did not have the power to supply 2 Type 730.

Also, it's interesting to look at the fire control system of the guns of 054.

It is clearly a fusion of the rice lamp radar, the E/O tracker + the Type 360 search radar. As part of the combat system, FCU-17 gets data from information console + radar input from the E/O tracker and rice lamp radar. And uses that to control the AK-630Ms and 100 mm gun. I always found it interesting that someone questioned the data fusion of 054A, when clearly system such as JRNG shows data fusion even for naval guns that look like what's used on Poyma-E

They combine radar data from multiple sources, process them, display aerial/surface data on multiple consoles. And then these information can be used to do the engagements.

I would expect 054A to use a far more advanced combat system + a more advance fire control system for naval gun + a more advanced FCS for HH-16. In both cases, each of the sensors may be used as radar inputs for multiple FCS. Whether that is plot level or track level data fusion remains to be seen.

You might have noticed that I spent much of the time on the air defense of 054A. The truth is that 054A provides the counter against multiple sea-skimmers that doesn't currently exist in PLAN. 051C and 052C are probably more used against the horde of incoming naval strike planes rather than the actual missiles. 054A in that sense provides the middle level air defense coverage that is currently lacking in PLAN. We've already seen two 054As joining the South Sea Fleet (one as 570 and the other we don't know). They are clearly badly needed for the air defense. As for ASuW, it doesn't differ much from 051C. It has the same OTH radar, datalink and missiles. In terms of ASW, this is where most of the criticism for the ship has come from. In many ways, it seems like PLAN is not putting much emphasis on ASW for surface fleet. It remains to be seen whether or future 054 will be equipped with towed array sonar. Or maybe they will continue to rely on 093 for all major ASW tasks.

More on 054A

SR-64 is one of the less known, but extremely important sensors on PLAN ships. We see it on 052B/C, 051C, 054A, 071 and 054. Although no formal information is out on SR-64, it is generally believed to have the scan rate and computational power needed to track multiple low flying supersonic anti-ship missiles. A commonly flown figure is that it has a detection range of 12 KM against sea-skimmers. There is also the more improbable figure of 100 km posted by Koxinga of CDF. Either way, it's location, scan rate, radar band all point to its role as tracking sea-skimmers. Many people have suspected that it has the same role as the radar that looks like Bandstand on Kashtan equipped ships. However, we've seen SR-64 on 071 and 054, which do not have Type 730 CIWS. It's clear that track or plot data from SR-64 goes into the combat system rather than straight into Type 730 CIWS. At the moment, it's a little unclear which sensor provides the mid-course update for the missiles. It could be the light-bulb datalink, which provides mid-course update for Anti-ship missiles, but maybe also provide update for HH-16. The Sea Eagle search radar, with its 12 rpm scan rate, does not seem to have the necessary refresh rate to provide updates for HH-16. SR-64 may have the additional responsibility of mid-course update on top of tracking sea-skimmers and surface targets. Or, some other less known sensor may be providing the mid-course updates. If continuous illuminations of FCRs is required, only a maximum of 4 targets can be engaged with 8 missiles. Since only terminal illuminations is required, 054A can theoretically engage against 8 targets simultaneously (although much less in actual practice) with the number of missiles limited by the number that can be launched during that time frame and also be limited by the number that the system can provide mid-course update for. Either way, we can conclude that 054A at the current time has much better multi-target engagement capabilities than prior PLAN ships with HH-16.

The often overlooked part of 054A's air defense are Type 730 CIWS and AK-176M. I wrote several posts on SDF in the past on Type 730's capabilities. Many people believe that Type 730 is inferior to Kashtan, because it does not have the gun+missile combination of Kashtan. In reality, PLAN was never too impressed by the performance of Kashtan in test trials. In terms of sensors, it has its own FCR + E/O tracker like Goalkeeper, Palma and Kashtan. And I think we can safely assume that it is integrated into the air defense system with all the sensors. The help of SR-64 would be extremely vital for Type 730. Especially in the case of 052C, where Type 730 CIWS pretty much has to deal with all sea-skimmers below 10 m, SR-64's main data recipient will probably be Type 730 CIWS. Although, with its own high frequency FCR and E/O tracker, it can track and shoot down targets independently. At this moment, I do not have the figures on Type 730 CIWS. Although, it is believed that Type 730 CIWS can encounter multiple supersonic missiles like Goalkeeper. I've read an article that has detailed account of Goalkeeper's performance versus multiple targets, but the only place online that seems to have this is this link. A good description is as follows:

This system can track up to thirty targets, engaging the four most urgent. It will minimize the salvo length to engage as many targets as possible and is thought to be able to deal with two pairs of sea-skimming missiles as little as five seconds apart.

It is generally believed that Type 730 CIWS was required to at least match, if not exceed, the performance of Goalkeeper. Which means, with the help of on-board sensors, each Type 730 CIWS can handle 4 or 5 concurrent sea skimmers.

Finally, the most overlooked part of 054A's air defense is probably AK-176M. The one overly hyped main gun that everyone seems to know about is the Oto Melara super rapid 76 mm gun. It seems like China evaluated Oto 76 with French 100 mm pre-TianAnMen Square and decided at that time, the 100 mm was better. Later, they evaluated between AK-176 and French 100 mm and preferred AK-176. To bring out some of the reasonings used (copied off my original SDF translations):

• they originally compared oto 76 with the 100 mm naval gun to see which one was better to import and they picked 100 mm one and AK-176 turned out to have even more advantages.
• at that time, OTO-76 did not have the automation level of 100 mm gun. at that time, it was also easier for China to develop guided munitions for 100 mm. And 054's 100 mm was simplified by over 40% in sensors, but it's high speed shooting reliability is not good
• Firing rate and muzzle velocity are extremely important for China due to the requirement to counter anti-ship missiles. That's where AK-176M has serious advantage.
  
• China started to develop 76 mm around 92 to 94. After improving on AK-176, it did not bother to look at the super rapid OTO-76. The muzzle velocity of OTO-76 is 920 m/s, whereas AK-176 is 980 m/s. Over 5000 m, the flight time is 2.5 second shorter. Also AK-176 fires off 10 more rounds.
• After china improved on AK-176M, it is much faster at replacing rounds than OTO-76. Auto-reload is important, the improve AK-176 can achieve reload in no time, whereas OTO-76 is behind here
• You can always improve on sensors/automation (newer electronics) and projectile guidance (use newer rounds), but muzzle velocity, firing rate and reloading speed are extremely important too.
• Also, the figure given for accuracy is only for single round 1000 m. When firing 60 to 90 consecutive shots, there is no difference. Also, AK-176's munition is better than OTO, as it can better defend against multiple targets in high threat environment.

I can't testify to every statement made there, but most of it did make sense to me when I first read it. Either way, China put AK-176M and a brand new FCR (different from the 100 mm's FCR) on 054A and 071, so it must be quite impressed with their performance.

Theoretically speaking, each 054A has the capability to track many targets at different flight profiles (even the fast + low ones) and also the capability to engage many of them at the same time. It's clearly quite an advanced air defense frigate (although not as sophisticated as those European "AAW frigate"). With the next set of 054 sensors currently on 891 undergoing tests, it would be interesting to see how much more capable the next batch of 054A will be. I'm looking forward to update more on Type 730 CIWS and 054A sensors + other parts like it ASuW and ASW capability in a future post. Until then, I hope this gives a good initial overview on 054A's air defense capabilities.

Latest rumour coming out of the PLAAF land

I'd like to finish up on 054A, but there are certain air force related matters that I want to go over.

As you have all probably noticed, there was a Russian report that China will deliver 24 J-10s to Iran. Now, I have to say that the original report was full of errors just in terms of its description of J-10. It basically called J-10 a clone of Lavi (which is not close to the truth). Of course, the Israeli and American news services picked up on this and harped on China's betrayal of Israel's help. They also made sure readers noticed that American tax dollars are not only spent on J-10, but will also be forwarded to Iran, their enemy. Aside from the obvious part that the Israelis stopped helping the J-10 project in 1995 (first flight didn't come until 1998), people fail to realize that J-10 would've been completed eventually with or without the Israeli help (although there is no doubt that the Israeli assistance sped up the development process). There are several reasons why China would not sell J-10 at this point:

1. China does not export its best technology (similar to USA and Russia). In fact, several years back, the Iranians were interested in J-8F. However, China was only willing to offer F-8IIM, so the deal fell through. Until J-11B is fully in service J-10 is by far China's most powerful aerial threat. If they would not even export J-8F to Iran, why would they export J-10?
2. The risk of J-10 falling into American hands is too great. If J-10 is exported to Iran, then the likelihood of it falling into American hands after a confrontation against Iran is extremely high. In that case, US would be able to take it back, examine the aircraft and get all of its performance parameters. Once that happens, the effectiveness of current and future J-10 would be significantly reduced. In fact, it is actually more beneficial to US if J-10 gets exported to Iran (especially considering the likelihood of military action against it).
3. If JF-17 is good enough for Iran, why would J-10 need to be exported. In fact, Iran was always expected to be the largest JF-17 customer outside of Pakistan. There have even been talks of an assembly line for JF-17 in Iran.
4. China has also apparently helped Iran on Shafaq and its indigenous F-5. It can do a lot of business with Iran without having to sell its most advanced fighter, why would it do it?
5. There is also the recent sanction by US on IRG. It's possible that any Chinese companies dealing with IRG will get sanctions. Would companies like SAC and CAC sacrifice their contracting jobs with Boeing just to make a few bucks with Iran?

In general, I think there are simply too many factors against such a move.

There have also been some rumours out regarding China's 5th generation fighter. The latest word is that SAC did not win the competition as many had suspected. Rather, it is a combined effort with CAC. In fact, it seems CAC is getting the lion share of the design work. Now, it's likely that the assembly line in Shenyang (112) will be in charge of the main final assembly rather than the one in Chengdu (132). Make a note, there is a difference between the design bureau (601 for SAC, 611 for CAC) and the actual factory producing the aircraft (112 for SAC and 132 for CAC). Due to Shenyang's experience producing heavy fighters like J-11, it might get the final assembly order, but that remains to be seen. If this is the case, then CAC might not put as much resource into the much talked about twin-engined J-10 project. Either way, there are a lot of projects for both SAC and CAC in the coming years.

Another recent rumour is the existence of JH-7B variant, but I'm still waiting for more photos to come out on that.

Finally, it seems like Russians have cut off Shenyang for the components to J-11, because they are worried that China will not make any orders for su-35, if J-11B becomes to successful (too late in my mind). But as it turns out, the domestic suppliers have stepped up and it hasn't been a problem. In fact, a recent avic1 article talked about J-11 changing engines. I'm not sure if it's talking about equipping new J-11Bs with WS-10A or just swapping older flankers with WS-10A. You can find the article here:

本报讯 近日，中国一航沈阳飞机设计研究所提前完成型号飞机换装发动机及鉴定试飞，飞机顺利转场；取得阶段性成果。一航沈阳所所长、型号总师孙聪荣获中国一航“总经理特别奖”。

型号飞机发动机换装项目是中央军委、中国一航决策的重点科研项目，从机上改装到试飞结束仅有一个月时间，周期短，任务重。

一航沈阳所充分发挥总师单位的主导作用，以高度的政治责任感和使命感，积极发扬团队合作精神，与兄弟单位通力合作，精心部署，加大管理力度，对每个工作环节制定详细的日计划，组织精兵强将专项跟踪，盯飞、盯数据、盯进度，跟产现场，服务现场，在较短时间内先后完成了方案论证、成品技术协调、改装发图与现场技术支持、地面试验、空地勤培训、试飞技术支持等各项工作。

在调板系统一项成品换装及技术鉴定试飞的关键阶段，改进的成品在试飞中出现斜板系统故障。参研人员结合飞参数据模拟飞行状态检查、分析故障机理，确定故障系控制器“收紧”与起调转换软件判故逻辑存在缺陷造成，协助承制单位制定并落实解决措施，完成试验验证，排除了故障，为提前完成阶段任务赢得了宝贵时间。

在项目实施过程中，一航沈阳所所长、型号总师孙聪精心筹划，现场指挥，对技术核心问题和影响进度的关键问题当场决策。当无损检测发现板材复合材料分层时，他立即组织专业人员集智攻关。改进方案确定后，孙聪亲自带队现场办公。由于措施得当，及时解决这一影响飞行安全的“瓶颈”问题，确保了项目阶段任务顺利完成。

一航沈阳所党委书记褚晓文多次带队深入一线，慰问指导，组织调配，鼓舞士气。各职能机关大力支持，密切配合做好后勤保障，促进问题加速解决。全所参研人员克服一个个难关，为项目顺利进行铺平了道路，创造了换装交付周期最短的奇迹。

It says that it takes one month from the start of changing engine to the end of flight test. Looks like J-11B has is finally fully indigenous.

054A Air Defense

The most important part of 054A's Air defense is probably it's HH-16 medium ranged SAM. In order to understand it, one probably should look at Shtil system. The setup of HH-16 air defense on 054A is similar in most aspects to that of SA-N-7 on Sov, so we can start by studying some of the articles on that system. Then we will look at Shtil VLU for further guidance on the performance of a VLS system over a traditional launcher. Please right click to see the article more clearly, they are written in Chinese:

Shtil (SA-N-7) was developed in the 80s with bombers, fighter-bombers, fighters, helicopters and different types of missiles to counter in mind. On each of the Soviet 956, there are launchers of 24 missiles on both front and end of the ship. It is similar to MK-13 launching SM-1. There are 6 illuminators per ship to allow for engagements against 6 targets. In early 90s, improved shtil (SA-N-12) was developed and each system costs $15 million (not including the missiles) in 1993.

Each system consists of a 3D search radar (Top Plate), Illuminators, Optronic directors (IRST?), tracking distribution machine, target display machine, firing control machine, central processing computer, missiles, launcher,

Diagram of the system, Top Plate has search and tracking mode. In search/Early warning mode, the data is collected for OK-10B and then passed to central processing machine. In tracking mode, the targets are distributed by 2 NKO machine to 12 display terminals. These tracking data goes to the central processing machine. There are 4 optronic or TV seekers, their data can be displayed on display terminal and also passed to the central processor.
The 6 illuminators operate on C band, with 4 kW average power output and 1.2 tonne in weight. They use continuous wave illumination to illuminate one target each.

NKO divides display into 8x12=96 area. It can send the target info to any of the 12 OH-4 display terminal.
There are 12 such terminals, each one can display the information of 2 targets.
4 OT-10 TV display and is used under strong ECM environment and TV seeker is doing the main tracking.

OK-10 fire control terminal. It has two display, allowing for selection of engagement against most dangerous targets.

More up close display, shows 2 UBK central processors

This system is an improvement over previous generation since it combined the searching and tracking to one radar with Top Plate. It uses parabolic pass to encounter low altitude target and shows good performance against sea clutter and other distractions. System is modular, can have anywhere from 2 to 12 fire channels.

Talks about SA-N-12's improvements including adding inertial correction (middle course update), updates to illuminator and different missile components, new target recognition technology?, increased length by 0.2m (and range to 38 km).
It fire 30 missiles in tests. 5 of which are against AShM traveling at 3 m and they all hit the target.

List some critical stats of SA-N-7 and they include:

• max 25 km range vs planes flying at over 1000 m and 18 km vs planes under 1000 m, min is 3.5 km. Altitude is 15 m to 15 km
• max 12 km vs missiles less than mach 2 and 8-9 km vs missiles more than mach 2, min range is 3.5 km. Altitude is 10 m to 10 km
• system reaction is 16 to 19 s and preparation time is less than 3 minutes
• Rate of fire is 14 s with 1 launcher and 7 s with 2 launchers
• Kill probability using 2 missiles is 0.81 to 0.96 against planes + 0.43 to 0.86 against missiles
• Top Plate figures include 360 degree coverage in azimuth and 45 degree in elevation, 200 km range against 2 sqm fighter targets and 0.75 x radar horizon against 0.1 sqm missile targets (It's around 0.9 x radar horizon when missile altitude <= 10 m)

This part compares SA-N-12 to Shtil VLU. As you can see, the rate of fire sped up from 12 s to 2 s. That's the main difference with using VLS instead of conventional launcher. Clearly, SA-N-12 is a significant improvement over SA-N-7 in terms of engaging sea-skimmers.

JANE'S MISSILES AND ROCKETS - DECEMBER 01, 2004
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Russia moves to vertical-launch Shtil
Miroslav Gyürösi

Russia is offering a vertical-launch (VL) version of the Shtil-1 naval surface-to-air missile (SAM) system, writes Miroslav Gyürösi. The move from a system based on trainable launchers to one based on below-deck VL modules is similar to that taken by the US Navy in the mid-1980s when it switched from a Mk 26 trainable launcher to a VL system for the sixth and subsequent Ticonderoga-class Aegis cruisers.

Russian Public Joint Stock Company DNPP (Dolgoprudnenskoye naucsno - proizvodstvennoye predpriyatie), which is part of the Almaz-Antey Air Defence Concern, developed the new 9M317ME SAM as an upgrade for the Shtil-1 naval air-defence system. Developed by the Altair Naval Radio Electronics Scientific Institute Public Joint Stock Company, which is also a member of the Almaz-Antey Air Defence Concern, Shtil-1 is an improved version of the earlier Shtil system that is the export variant of the M-22 Uragan system fitted to the Project 956 (Sovremenny-class) destroyers.

The 9M38 missile was developed in the 1970s to be a common round for the land-based 9K37 Buk (SA-11 'Gadfly') and naval Uragan/Shtil (SA-N-7 'Gadfly') system. It used a configuration similar to that of the US Standard Missile, with cruciform wings of long chord and short span, plus cruciform tail surfaces. In the land-based system, the 9M38 was fired from 9A38 and 9A310 self-propelled launch vehicles, while the naval Shtil and Shtil-1 systems used a trainable launcher fed by a below-deck loading system based on 12-cell drum magazines.

In the early 1990s, development started on an improved 9M317 missile able to replace the 9M38. This armed the Buk-M1-2 (SA-17 'Grizzly') system, which entered service with the Russian Army in 1998. The 9M317 was similar in configuration to the 9M38 but the cruciform wings were of much smaller chord and span.

The new 9M317ME missile is being marketed as a further development of the older 9M38 and 9M317 but the changes are on a scale that makes the round almost a new missile. It is designed to be fired from a cylindrical container/launcher mounted in a cell within the new Shtil-1 VL system. This arrangement provides a much higher rate of fire than the original trainable launcher and magazine system used in Shtil and Shtil-1. The latter could fire a missile every six seconds, but the 9M317ME-based system being offered for Sovremenny-class destroyers can fire rounds at one-to-two-second intervals.

The new launch technique has required drastic changes to the configuration of the missile. The long-chord wings have been replaced by vestigial fixed surfaces located not on the missile centrebody but near the rear of the airframe just ahead of the cruciform tail surfaces. These fixed surfaces may be intended to control the airflow passing the tail fins. The latter move to steer the missile - the same control scheme used on the 9M38 - but are folded to allow the round to be stored in the container/launcher.

The 9M317ME is 5.18 m long and 360 mm in diameter. The tail surfaces have a span of 820 mm when deployed.

After the round leaves the VL, a spring mechanism unfolds the tail surfaces and four gas-control vanes operating in the motor efflux turn the missile towards the required direction of flight. Once this turnover manoeuvre is completed, the gas-control vanes are no longer used. Subsequent flight control is via the moving tail surfaces.

A dual-mode solid-propellant rocket motor based on a more energetic charge than that used in the 9M38 provides the missile with a maximum speed of Mach 4.5 (1,550 m/s), a significant increase over the Mach 3.0 (1,230 m/s) of the older missile.

Guidance remains a combination of inertial and semi-active radar (SAR) homing. Inertial guidance is used in the early stages of flight and then the SAR seeker is activated to complete the interception. If the missile is being fired against long-range targets, it can receive mid-course updates while flying under inertial control. Launch weight of the 9M317ME is 581 kg. It is armed with a 62 kg warhead initiated by a dual-mode (active or semi-active) radar proximity fuze, or a contact fuze.

The range of the modernised Shtil-1 system is between 3.5-32 km, while the altitude coverage is from 5 m up to 15 km. These limits are set not by the performance of the missile but by the capabilities of the existing shipboard illuminating radars. This suggests further growth potential if the system is upgraded or if new radars are added.

The VL version of Shtil-1 is being offered for surface ships with displacement of more than 1,500 tonnes, providing protection against aircraft, helicopters, fast patrol boats and anti-ship missiles. It can also control the ship's guns. Publicly, no claims are being made for an anti-ballistic missile (ABM) capability, but the land-based 3M317 missile is reported to have successfully engaged Smerch artillery rockets and a ballistic missile during tests conducted in the mid-1990s. The VL system's ability to cope with tactical ballistic-missile threats may be limited by the performance of the existing shipboard radars.

The basic VL module contains 12 9M317ME missiles but, as with the unmodified Shtil and Shtil-1 systems, the upgrade is being offered in a series of optional configurations, which add greater numbers of MR-90 Orekh ('Front Dome') target-illumination radars and additional VL modules. All variants use target information from the ship's 3D surveillance radar.

Vertical-launch Shtil-1 configurations

Technical characteristic Option number
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Reaction time, [seconds] 5 - 10 5 - 10 5 - 10 5 - 10 5 - 10 5 - 10 5 - 10 5 - 10
Firing interval [seconds] 2 - 3 2 - 3 2 - 3 1 - 2 1 - 2 1 - 2 1 - 2 1 - 2
Number of target channels 2 4 4 6 8 8 10 12
Magazine capacity [rounds] 12 24 36 48 - 72 72 108 108 - 144 144
Number of VL modules 1 2 3 4 - 6 6 9 9 - 12 12

It mentions numerous things, but an interesting stats is the bottom table. This shows reaction time of 5 to 10 s + firing rate of 1-3 s. The shtil VLU is clearly a significant improvement over the original shtil.

So, what does this mean for 054A?
First, the Sea Eagle search radar is generally believed to be newer and more powerful than Top Plate radar. It is an evolution of the Sea Eagle radar on the lone 051B. An article chronically the development process of this radar said that it went through the most grueling testing process of any naval radar in Chinese history. The title of the article states that it can "see over 500 km away". That sounds even longer than S1850M, which has much larger antenna. Even so, it does seem to be upgrade vs different targets in terms of range and reliability of detection. Here is a picture of a series of Chinese radars.

Here is what the radar on 052B, 054A and test ship 891 looks like



It seems 891's search radar has more rows of antenna than 054A, which has more rows of antenna than 052B. From the previous picture, it would indicate that 052B is operating on E band (like it should, since it's Top Plate), 054A and 891's search radar look like they operating on different bands or possibly using different scanning methods. Either way, the pictures show that 054A's radar should be superior to that of 052B and the new one 891 is trying out should be even better. Another item of interest are the FCR, SA-N-12 was said to only need illumination during the terminal stage of engagement. At the same time, each FCR are improved so that they have two channels and can engage two targets that are "close by". The ones on 054A and 891 are said to also be able to engage two targets. Another big part of the sensory unit is the SR-64 radar, which I have talked about extensively in previous blogs. I think it could be the on-board tracking radar for Type 730 CIWS like the one that looks like bandstand for Kashtan CIWS, although we've also seen it on 071, which only has AK-630 and AK-176. Either way, I think it's integrated into the combat system as part of HH-16 air defense. Other sensors in the suite include the IRST that is installed on the front mast and what looks to be an E/O tracker placed closed to the bandstand radar. Although, that sensor looks different from the E/O tracker we see on 054 and 022. Either way, 054A has a whole set of sensors that are generally speaking far more advanced than what was on 956 and more advanced than what was placed on 052B.

And the final question is what level of data fusion there is. From the SA-N-7 system diagram, it's clear that it has tracking level integration between the optronic sensors and Top Plate. One question that was challenged to me a while back is whether or not it has plot level integration. We know that the system reaction time has improved from 16-19 s to 5-10 s for SA-N-12. Most of that is probably due to the much better sensors, but it could also be due to a plot level integration. Either way, we have data fusion on 052C between the 4 large AESA radar panels, so we know that such technology is possible for 054A. And we have also seen 891 testing the entire air defense suite (see previous blogs), which suggestion a high level of integration between all of the sensors involved. Therefore, we can only say at the present time that 054A has at least tracking level integration and might have plot level integration also.

Finally, if I was to go through certain performance parameter on HH-16, I would say that the system reaction time and launch rate are probably close to that of VLU shtil. A launch rate of 2s per launch is probably expected from a VLS unit. I would expect the system reaction time to be around 6 to 7 s, since that is the figure often used for the export version of HH-7. These are certainly tremendous improvements over the original shtil. As for the range of HH-16, it's often been stated as to be more than that of HQ-2. I would say that's quite likely, since HH-16's best comparison is probably ESSM with USN. Now, the range against different types of target like fighters and anti-ship missiles will probably be similar to that of Shtil. I would expect the requirements for HH-16 to be at least as good as the latest shtil or else China would've just equipped with shtil. Based on the above stats of shtil, you can get a good idea of HH-16's performance. Although it's interesting that the size of HH-16 VLS indicates that the missile itself is smaller than shtil (which is almost 600 kg).

There is also Type 730 CIWS and AK-176M left on 054A, which I will try to go through with the next article.

Nuclear submarines

I'm sure everyone who follows PLA has seen the recent GE pictures for 094s and also clear photos of 094. I think it was a surprise for many to see 3 094 parked outside in broad daylight (about the same length and clearly larger than original 092). Personally, I'm not knowledgeable enough about submarines to provide analysis on how advanced these boats are or how quiet they are.

Therefore, I thought I'd share some comments made by certain credible poster on Chinese military bbs. Now, I'm not saying they are not necessarily true, but they have made good impressions in the past.

The points are as follows:

• There are 3 of these 094s, but there are also another SSBN at work that does not have the humps. Apparently, that SSBN is being worked on right now at Huludao (called 094 Type 2)
  
• There are at least two 092s and they will be converted to SSGNs. Each tube can hold 3 to 5 LACMs (I guess DH-10 or something like that)
• There are 5 093s as 2005, I guess either undergoing sea tests or commissioned.
• The first 095 or 093G is being worked on and will be launched by 2010.
• They are expected to have 8 093/095s by 2010
• Another 2 094s are expected by 2010

I'm not sure what we can say at the moment except that there are 094s that may or may not be commissioned. The number of 5 093s seem at least logical to give us an almost 2:1 ratio of SSNs to SSBNs (including 3 091G and 1-2 092). Huludao seems to be building nuclear subs at an extremely rapid pace. And 093 and 094 designs must be pretty formalized for them to allow so many pictures coming out.

JF-17 and PLAAF

I've been thinking about the topic of JF-17's role in PLA for a long time and decided that this is a probably a good time to put it in words. However, before we get to this topic, a more pressing issue seems to be the semi-unveiling of Z-10 assault helicopter. At the current time, China is mainly reliant on Z-9G and modified Mi-17s as its assault helo force. There is also an assault version of Z-11, but that seems to be not in PLA's plans due to its small size. What we can clearly see with the recent photo of Z-10 is that it is a tremendous improvement over Z-9G. From the outside, it looks like it will become the stealthiest helicopter in the world once it goes into service (since Comanche is axed already). There are some speculations that its infrared signature is as small as that of Comanche, but this has yet to be verified anywhere. The radar signature definitely looks to be smaller than other stealthy helicopters out there like the Tiger. From this picture, we can't even see the intake of Z-10, but I read that it's suppose to be at the back. We know that it has all the important features of a modern attack helicopter. A MMW radar like Longbow is under development and should be fitted on top of the rotor pretty soon. From a previous picture, Z-10 has 4 pylons. Each of which can carry 4 HJ-10 ATGMs (as seen in this picture) or 4 TY-90 AAMs. The transmission of Z-10 was supposedly co-developed with Eurocopter; and might even be more advanced than that of the Tiger. The rotor system and the engine are from Agusta and P&W Canada respectively. Indigenous replacement for both are currently in development. Z-10 has even flied off with WZ-9 engine last year. However, it appears to me that WZ-9 is still far below the performance level of PT7C series. A PT7C fitted Z-10 would have the highest T/W ratio of any helicopter in the world, but the same cannot be said about WZ-9. Therefore, PLA would have to decide whether it wants to use the cheaper+indigenous engine or the foreign+vastly superior engine. My hope is that WZ-9 is only fitted on enough helicopters to ensure that it will be a viable option if the PT7C choice is ever taken away. As we go forward, it looks like Z-10/Z-9G will form a hi-lo combination like Mi-28N/Mi-24 for the Russians. Z-10 is simply too expensive in the near term to be equipped more than that. Supposedly, a first regiment of 12 Z-10 are now deployed, so I will be waiting for more pictures to come out.


When JF-17 was started, the agreement was that China will buy 250, whereas Pakistan will buy 150. It looks like Pakistan will now place an order of 250 JF-17s due to the improvements that CAC made to the plane. It is expected to be used as the work horse of PAF in mostly A2A roles. Around the world, CAC is expected to market this fighter as a replacement to the F-7 series. Depending on the choice of avionics, weapons and engine, the price tag of JF-17 could be anywhere from $10 to $20 million. In PLAAF, China already has a hi-lo combination in J-10 and J-11. Future variants of J-11 will be used for long distance strike, ground attack, anti-ship missions and long range escort missions. Its range and payload allowed it to be chosen by PLANAF over J-10 for the first generation of PLAN aircraft carrier. J-10 remains the most deadly fighter jet in PLAAF and will be work horse of PLAAF for the next 2 decades. In the past few years, it has handed lopsided defeats to su-27/J-11A/su-30mkk in PLAAF exercises. Even against J-11B (which is equipped with a newer generation of avionics), it can still achieve parity with its much smaller RCS and greater maneuverability. With the modified J-10 coming into service soon, it will be the main air superiority platform until CAC's twin-engined "J-10" and SAC's 5th generation fighter comes online. It would seem like the core of PLAAF's fighter force would not include JF-17. JH-7A will be the main strike platform in both PLAAF and PLANAF until J-11BS comes along. JF-17 is not likely to take over the role of JH-7A or J-11BS in the future. Aside from that, J-7s and J-8s currently occupy the role of cheap aircrafts in PLA. JF-17 is obviously viewed by many as the prime candidate to take over the roles of J-7 in PLAAF. I think the number of JF-17s to be deployed in this role depends on the eventual cost of JF-17 and the number of regiments PLAAF wants to keep. if PLAAF chooses to keep the current number of fighters, JF-17 will obviously get a few hundred orders. If that does not happen (as is most likely the case), JF-17 will have to fight against J-8F for orders. It may surprise many people, but a WP-14 equipped J-8F would have many advantages against JF-17 (e.g: better T/W ratio, higher payload, better supersonic performance, more space for radar+avionics). So, where does JF-17 most likely fit in? The answer seems to be in the role of Q-5 replacement. Now, it has been believed for a long time that L-15 will assume the role of replacing Q-5 as the ground attack aircraft and replacing JJ-7 as the main LIFT for PLAAF. It turns out that Hongdu has been a huge disappointment for PLAAF. L-15 is likely to not get any orders from PLAAF in the near future. A decent order is expected for JL-9, but whether it can fully achieve the requirements of PLAAF is another issue. So, what does that mean? A twin-seated JF-17 will be required by PLAAF to take over the role of L-15. Obviously, a twin-seated JF-17 can be used to train pilots. It will be a tremendous improvement over Q-5 in flight performance, range, payload and avionics. Of course, changes will need to be made by CAC to make it more suited for CAS missions. However, the relatively low cost of an attack variant of JF-17 (it will not need all the fancy avionics of an air superiority version) would make it extremely attractive to PLAAF. This seems to be the current situation for JF-17. I will follow up if I get newer information on it.