Chủ Nhật, 31 tháng 3, 2013
31 March 2013 - crash Su-27UBK PLAAF. Near Rongcheng (Shandong prov.). Two pilots killed.
http://mil.news.sina.com.cn/2013-03-31/1846720223.html中国空军一架苏27双座型战机在山东荣成坠毁(图)
失事现场照片,显示飞机座舱已打开,飞行员或已弹射今日下午,一架空军战斗机在山东荣成海域坠毁,据称坠毁机型为苏27,据网友称两名驾驶员可能已经牺牲。苏
-27是苏联苏霍伊设计局研制的,单座双发全天候空中优势重型战斗机,中国空军从上世纪90年代初引进苏-27系列飞机。1991年底,首批12架苏
-27(8架单座型的苏-27SK和4架双座型的苏-27UBK)飞抵中国。至今,苏-27和国产歼-11及改进型共约有近300架。其主要任务是国土防
空。护航.海上巡逻等。
Thanks dererd2 for the update.
Thứ Bảy, 30 tháng 3, 2013
Norinco SH-1 Truck-mounted 155mm Gun-Howitzer of the Tatmadaw
While the Burma military is showing off their newly ordered Norinco SH-1 Truck-mounted 155mm Gun-Howitzer and other made-in-China hardware during their 68th
Armed Forces Day parade in Naypyitaw, the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) continues to use their made-in-China hardware to fight back the Tatmadaw
Type 81 mod and Type 89 Heavy Machine Gun in service with the KIA
Photo courtesy of
Armed Forces Day parade in Naypyitaw, the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) continues to use their made-in-China hardware to fight back the Tatmadaw
Type 81 mod and Type 89 Heavy Machine Gun in service with the KIA
Photo courtesy of
Photos of the day: Test Ship 892 at QingDao
with DH-10 LACM, naturally.
Saturday, July 28, 2012
In the age of internet, information can be borrowed without citing source.
I am shocked to see the following posted by Janes Defense Weekly this
morning…….They are calling Type052D a Frigate. JDW, you can do better.
Date Posted: 27-Jul-2012
Jane's Defence Weekly
China 'developing' navalised version of DH
Saturday, July 28, 2012
In the age of internet, information can be borrowed without citing source.
I am shocked to see the following posted by Janes Defense Weekly this
morning…….They are calling Type052D a Frigate. JDW, you can do better.
Date Posted: 27-Jul-2012
Jane's Defence Weekly
China 'developing' navalised version of DH
Thứ Sáu, 29 tháng 3, 2013
What to make of speculated deals for Su-35/Lada?
In the past week, there have been a lot of speculations regarding a deal where Russia would export 24 Su-35s and 4 Ladas to China. Now, there have been official denials from Russian government and sukhoi has also not put this on their website. That would indicate this deal is definitely not done yet. I normally would ignore these su-35 rumours from Russia, but there have been enough support reading through the Chinese sources for me to think that there are serious discussions for this. In addition, Chinese sources also indicate that there could also be sale of S-400 and IL-476 as part of a large deal. Obviously, this would be the largest sale package from China to Russia since probably 2002. I will just look at the individual parts of the deal and whether they make sense from a Chinese point of view.
Back in 2008 when the su-35 rumours first came out, it made sense for China to buy 2 or more regiments of Su-35. As time went on, it seemed like the domestic flankers produced by SAC have been more or less satisfactory for PLA. I often read on Western/Russian news sources about how they are shocked to see Russia is still willing to sell such an advanced aircraft to China even after China “cloned” Russian fighters, but those articles really do not seem to have a good grasp on reality. We know that China has two “stealth” fighter jet programs under development that will probably achieve IOC sometimes toward the end of this decade, so it doesn’t make sense for China to buy and then “copy” a large number of su-35s. Shenyang AC is actively developing and producing naval and fighter bomber versions of flankers in J-15 and J-16. Su-35 is mostly an air superiority aircraft, so it’s not going to help those projects. At the same time, China is also not exporting any of its flankers to other countries, so this export deal will not threaten Russia’s other export markets.
One of the reported reasons from Chinese side for purchasing Su-35 is the coming end of production of J-11B. They have requirement for 1 regiment (24 aircraft) of air superiority version of flankers before the more advanced 5th generation fighters can enter service. While that is possible, I think su-35 will create a logistical problem in the future like the Sov destroyers with the Chinese navy. They will need to maintain a new type of aircraft, a new engine, a new generation of Russian avionics and Russian missiles. That would seem to be a lot of trouble for just one regiment. That would lead to my conclusion that they are purchasing this strictly to get their hands on the 117S engine. Russia made it clear to China early on that they would only be willing to sell 117S to China as part of a Su-35 order. I think 24 is probably the minimum number of Su-35s that Russia would be willing to sell to China to allow Chinese access to 117S engine. China does have the largest MRO plant for AL-31F outside of Russia. All maintenance work for AL-31 is done inside China. I would assume 117S maintenance and life extension work would also be done there. Despite improvements in the reliability of WS-10A, I still read about problems found in deployment. If there is one problem that can cause real delay in J-20, it would be not having a reliable engine solution in its development and early deployment. 117S would also be possible options for J-10 and J-15/16 projects. If China does choose to purchase Su-35s, access to 117S engine would be the primary motivation. And Russia would benefit by exporting su-35 and possibly large numbers of 117S engine later.
The deal for 4 Lada submarines is more interesting. Many PLAN followers have asked why China would be interested in purchasing so many units of a submarine that Russia has not even accepted into its own service (its AIP system is not going to be ready until later). Typically, China chooses to only purchase mature systems that it can quickly induct into service. On top of that, it seems to some that Chinese submarines seem to have reached the technology levels of their Russian counterpart with that mysterious new conventional submarine in 2011. The reality is that Chinese submarines still have a way to go in stealth.
As part of this deal, China will be getting transfer of technology along with local production for 2 of the 4 submarines. On top of that, some unreported Chinese subsystems will be going onto these submarines. So, the question is what is China providing as part of this submarine and what is it interested in? The currently mass produced 039B submarine are already equipped with AIP system that can be installed on the Chinese version of Lada submarine. On top of that, China could install its own sonar system and combat systems onto Lada. The latter part should not be surprising since China has also installed its own sonar on kilo submarines. What China seeks as part of this deal is the Russian’s design of Lada submarine and its noise insulation technology. From Lada, China could learn how to design and build a single hull submarine with conformal sonar. If we look at China’s new submarine that came out in 2011, it seemed to adapt numerous features from Lada submarine. This submarine is supposedly one of a kind built to replace the old Gulf class ballistic missile test bed. It is probably too large and expensive to be mass produced. Based on their experience from this submarine and Lada project, it’s quite possible that China’s next series of submarine would look somewhere in between (possibly single hull) and have many of the features currently on Lada class. Russia also has a lot to gain here, because it needs a new submarine for export to replace kilo. Regardless of whether Russia chooses to use any Chinese subsystems for Lada in the future, Chinese involvement in this project will ensure that the export version of Lada becomes fully developed and commercially viable.
So while I’ve read numerous panic articles online about how this deal will significantly improve China’s capabilities and shift the cross strait balance of power even more toward China’s favour, I think those articles really show very little appreciation of China’s current military industrial complex. While these purchases will help and speed up PLA development, they are by no means game changers. However, these purchases will improve ties between the two countries at a time where Russia constantly complains about the trade imbalance.
Thứ Năm, 28 tháng 3, 2013
Photos of the day: PLAN in Malta
Local Maltese and tourists visit the Chinese frigate
"Hengyang" at the grand habour of Valletta, Malta, on March 27, 2013. An
Open Day of the "Hengyang" for Maltese was held on Wednesday. The 13th
naval escort squad, sent by the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA)
Navy, arrived at Valletta of Malta on Tuesday for a five-day visit after
finishing its escort missions. (xinhua/Xu Nizhi)
Thứ Tư, 27 tháng 3, 2013
Myanmar Military's PTL02 6x6 Wheeled Self-Propelled 100mm Assault Gun on parade
Hope she likes them
Aung San Suu Kyi, right, with Major General Zaw Win during Burma's 68th
Armed Forces Day parade in Naypyitaw. Photograph: Nyein Chan
Naing/AFP/Getty Images
Just in case you were wondering; those are not Norinco Type97 5.56mm but rather Myanmar EMER K-1 5.56mm
Aung San Suu Kyi, right, with Major General Zaw Win during Burma's 68th
Armed Forces Day parade in Naypyitaw. Photograph: Nyein Chan
Naing/AFP/Getty Images
Just in case you were wondering; those are not Norinco Type97 5.56mm but rather Myanmar EMER K-1 5.56mm
Thứ Ba, 26 tháng 3, 2013
Brokeback PLAN
You know, I used to wonder how come you never brought any trouts home.
You always said you caught plenty, and you know how me and the girls
like fish
After spending a year at Xiaopingdao, this 094 Jin Class SSBN readies to sortie out. Given the fact that it sails in broad daylight "to catch trouts", don't think they still consider their Jin project a top secret anymore.
Photos of the day: J-20 mounting a pair of PL-10 Advanced Short Range Air-to-Air Missiles
Sunday, November 20, 2011
PL-10 AAM spotted on a J-11B
Is this the first photo of the PL10, China Air Force's next generation of High Agility AAM?
Word on the street seems to agree.
Close by, a freshly minted J-11B undergo flight-testing
Thứ Sáu, 22 tháng 3, 2013
Thứ Năm, 21 tháng 3, 2013
Photos of the day: Sizing a small island in South China Sea, by a PLAN Marine company
A combat-readiness patrol and high-sea training
taskforce under the South China Sea Fleet of the Navy of the Chinese
People’s Liberation Army (PLA) carried out beach-seizing and landing
training in the waters of the South China Sea on March 21, 2012. The
officers and men are pushing an assault boat out of the dock.
(chinamil.com.cn/Qian Xiaohu, Song Xin Gao Yi and Gan Jun)
taskforce under the South China Sea Fleet of the Navy of the Chinese
People’s Liberation Army (PLA) carried out beach-seizing and landing
training in the waters of the South China Sea on March 21, 2012. The
officers and men are pushing an assault boat out of the dock.
(chinamil.com.cn/Qian Xiaohu, Song Xin Gao Yi and Gan Jun)
Thứ Tư, 20 tháng 3, 2013
Photos of the day: New PLAN LCAC 3321
South China Sea Fleet conducts combat readiness patrol and high-sea training(Source: China Military Online) 2013-03-20The “Jinggangshan” amphibious dock landing ship leaves a naval port in Sanya in south China’s Hainan province on the afternoon of March 19, 2013. (Photo by Li Zhanglong) A taskforce under the South China Sea Fleet of the Navy of the Chinese People’s
Thứ Ba, 19 tháng 3, 2013
Comparing Type 056 to LCS
With the recent induction of 056, a lot of comparison has been made between 056 and LCS. The comparisons are understandable. Both are just entering services. Both are expected to be built in large numbers and are also considered to be the lower end ships of their respective navy. In many ways, their comparison stops there, because Type 054A would be more comparable to LCS just based on the size and dimensions of the ships. I want to break this down to two sections: the differences in capabilities/cost between the two classes of ships and what that tells us about the two navies.
First of all, despite both ships are designed for littoral operations, one is designed to operate in its own waters, whereas the other is designed to operate in enemy waters. 056 is supposed to replace 053 and 037 in the role of patrolling coastal waters. It's equipped with enough strike power to conduct ASuW against other regional navy. With some modification, it can also be useful in ASW operations in the littoral waters. On the other hand, LCS is suppose to be faster, stealthier, far more modular and capable of operation in other country's littoral waters. USN has no need for something like 056, since it faces no foreign naval threat within its coastal waters. For any issues like smuggling, piracy and drug trafficking, it should be up to coastal guard to protect. At the same time, China has no need for a littoral ship as large or fast as LCS, because it really has no need in the near future for a ship built specifically to fight in the littoral waters of a non-neighbouring country. While most of the mission packages for LCS have yet to finish development, LCS will be capable of ASuW, ASW, MCM and special ops once that does happen. You might see more dedicated ASW or ASuW variants of Type 056 coming out, but each ship is really not expected to be doing more than one task.
As a result of this difference in roles and size of the ship, there is also a large gap in the cost of the ship. Each LCS cost over $400 million to build and equip. That's about twice as much as the cost of a Type 054A. Type 056 is expected to be a much cheaper ship than Type 054A, since it's much smaller. My current estimate for Type 056 is around around 60 million just based on the cost of Type 022, Type 054 and equivalent sized cutters (which run for about $15 to 20 million each). The relatively low cost of this should explain why China is able to build so many units in such short time while also build numerous other classes at the same time. If this cost more, China would not be able to use it to replace all of the old Type 053 and 037 ships. Despite the recent austerity in USN and the higher cost of American shipbuilding, USN still has a far higher budget than PLAN, so it could afford more expensive ships.
The size of crews also show us interesting things about the two navies. I think the crew size for LCS is supposed to be at most 75, whereas the much smaller 056 is expected to have 60 to 70 crews (even that is a reduction to 1/3 of Type 053). Even though Type 056 is far more complex and automated than the ships it is replacing, it's probably safe to say that it still lags modern Western ships. I think a large part of that has to do with the greater number of service personnels at the disposal of PLAN. Even with the rising labour cost in China, I think it's safe to assume that the compensation for a USN sailor is far higher than that of a PLAN sailor. Another part to look at is the huge leap facing sailors who are accustomed to operating a low tech ship like type 037 (I was told no training is required to be on that ship) to type 056. It's simply unrealistic to expect someone who has operated on Type 037/053 for their entire life to be able to be competent on something like LCS. As PLAN continues modernization, this expected improvement in software is often overlooked when one looks at the new ships that are coming out. The cost of training crew members will also go up as ships become more and more complicated.
Another interesting thing is the choice that the two navies made in developing these two ships. LCS is a ship expected to be modular enough to be able to easily reconfigure for different roles by changing to different mission packages. I expect different variants of Type 056 to come with each variant built with specific role in mind. Similary to Type 037, I would expect to see a Type 056 emphasize more toward ASW and one more emphasized toward patrol and another more emphasized toward ASuW. At the same time, LCS had the requirements to be able to travel at faster than 40 knots and also be extremely stealthy. It certainly pushes the technological envelope, whereas Type 056 does not. LCS is not only a new ship design but also requires new weapon system. Whereas PLAN rarely builds a shipping class that requires leap in both the ship design and its weapon system. I think this shows the background of both navies. USN always had a lot of money to spend, so it is willing to press for that additional performance on the newest ships in the face of budget overruns and delays. In comparison, PLAN had very little money back in the days and most of its programs was canned in the 80s and 90s due to lack of funding. So as a result of this, it has always been more conservative in incorporating improvement from one shipping class to the next. Compared to USN, PLAN is more frugal in the development of new ships and the management of its existing fleet. As an example, Type 052 underwent modernization recently, but the old HH-7 SAM was kept around instead of being replaced by more advance HQ-10 SAM. PLAN has a large stock of HH-7 missiles in stock and did not want them to go to waste by removing them from the ships undergoing modernization. It will be interesting to see how the perspectives of the two navies change in the future as PLAN continues to get more funding whereas USN starts to face austerity.
First of all, despite both ships are designed for littoral operations, one is designed to operate in its own waters, whereas the other is designed to operate in enemy waters. 056 is supposed to replace 053 and 037 in the role of patrolling coastal waters. It's equipped with enough strike power to conduct ASuW against other regional navy. With some modification, it can also be useful in ASW operations in the littoral waters. On the other hand, LCS is suppose to be faster, stealthier, far more modular and capable of operation in other country's littoral waters. USN has no need for something like 056, since it faces no foreign naval threat within its coastal waters. For any issues like smuggling, piracy and drug trafficking, it should be up to coastal guard to protect. At the same time, China has no need for a littoral ship as large or fast as LCS, because it really has no need in the near future for a ship built specifically to fight in the littoral waters of a non-neighbouring country. While most of the mission packages for LCS have yet to finish development, LCS will be capable of ASuW, ASW, MCM and special ops once that does happen. You might see more dedicated ASW or ASuW variants of Type 056 coming out, but each ship is really not expected to be doing more than one task.
As a result of this difference in roles and size of the ship, there is also a large gap in the cost of the ship. Each LCS cost over $400 million to build and equip. That's about twice as much as the cost of a Type 054A. Type 056 is expected to be a much cheaper ship than Type 054A, since it's much smaller. My current estimate for Type 056 is around around 60 million just based on the cost of Type 022, Type 054 and equivalent sized cutters (which run for about $15 to 20 million each). The relatively low cost of this should explain why China is able to build so many units in such short time while also build numerous other classes at the same time. If this cost more, China would not be able to use it to replace all of the old Type 053 and 037 ships. Despite the recent austerity in USN and the higher cost of American shipbuilding, USN still has a far higher budget than PLAN, so it could afford more expensive ships.
The size of crews also show us interesting things about the two navies. I think the crew size for LCS is supposed to be at most 75, whereas the much smaller 056 is expected to have 60 to 70 crews (even that is a reduction to 1/3 of Type 053). Even though Type 056 is far more complex and automated than the ships it is replacing, it's probably safe to say that it still lags modern Western ships. I think a large part of that has to do with the greater number of service personnels at the disposal of PLAN. Even with the rising labour cost in China, I think it's safe to assume that the compensation for a USN sailor is far higher than that of a PLAN sailor. Another part to look at is the huge leap facing sailors who are accustomed to operating a low tech ship like type 037 (I was told no training is required to be on that ship) to type 056. It's simply unrealistic to expect someone who has operated on Type 037/053 for their entire life to be able to be competent on something like LCS. As PLAN continues modernization, this expected improvement in software is often overlooked when one looks at the new ships that are coming out. The cost of training crew members will also go up as ships become more and more complicated.
Another interesting thing is the choice that the two navies made in developing these two ships. LCS is a ship expected to be modular enough to be able to easily reconfigure for different roles by changing to different mission packages. I expect different variants of Type 056 to come with each variant built with specific role in mind. Similary to Type 037, I would expect to see a Type 056 emphasize more toward ASW and one more emphasized toward patrol and another more emphasized toward ASuW. At the same time, LCS had the requirements to be able to travel at faster than 40 knots and also be extremely stealthy. It certainly pushes the technological envelope, whereas Type 056 does not. LCS is not only a new ship design but also requires new weapon system. Whereas PLAN rarely builds a shipping class that requires leap in both the ship design and its weapon system. I think this shows the background of both navies. USN always had a lot of money to spend, so it is willing to press for that additional performance on the newest ships in the face of budget overruns and delays. In comparison, PLAN had very little money back in the days and most of its programs was canned in the 80s and 90s due to lack of funding. So as a result of this, it has always been more conservative in incorporating improvement from one shipping class to the next. Compared to USN, PLAN is more frugal in the development of new ships and the management of its existing fleet. As an example, Type 052 underwent modernization recently, but the old HH-7 SAM was kept around instead of being replaced by more advance HQ-10 SAM. PLAN has a large stock of HH-7 missiles in stock and did not want them to go to waste by removing them from the ships undergoing modernization. It will be interesting to see how the perspectives of the two navies change in the future as PLAN continues to get more funding whereas USN starts to face austerity.
Chủ Nhật, 17 tháng 3, 2013
Communist propaganda of the day: North Korean Artillery
They might not be very smart, but they are really big.
The undated photo provided by Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) on March
14, 2013 shows Kim Jong-un, top leader of the Democratic People's
Republic of Korea (DPRK), watching a live shell firing drill at the
southwest sector of the front line. Kim Jong-un watched and guided the
drill which was conducted by the Jangjae Islet defense
The undated photo provided by Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) on March
14, 2013 shows Kim Jong-un, top leader of the Democratic People's
Republic of Korea (DPRK), watching a live shell firing drill at the
southwest sector of the front line. Kim Jong-un watched and guided the
drill which was conducted by the Jangjae Islet defense
Thứ Bảy, 16 tháng 3, 2013
Z-10 of the 1st LH Brigade, 54th Group Army, Jinan MR
Fast forward three and half months, a new Z-10 squadron emerges. This marks the fifth Z-10 squadrons in army aviation service. It is not, by any stretch of the imagination, to see all 10 of PLA's LH brigades will be equipped with at least one Z-10 squadron soon.
Wednesday, December 26, 2012
9th PLA LH Brigade, 39th Group Army, Shanyang MR, the fourth confirmed Z-10 operator
Wednesday, December 26, 2012
9th PLA LH Brigade, 39th Group Army, Shanyang MR, the fourth confirmed Z-10 operator
Photos of the day: pumping lead, Liaoning style
Tuesday, May 17, 2011
New PLAN ten barreled CIWS unmasked.
A new PLAN CIWS recently unmasked on-board of the Varyag sporting a
total of 10 tubes. Well, that is just not fast enough.........because
it is not Up To Eleven.
The current in service model of Type 730 CIWS seven-barreled 30 mm
Gatling CIWS with a maximum firing rate of 5800 rounds per minute.
Thứ Sáu, 15 tháng 3, 2013
Photos of the day: Uniforms and emblem of the new Chinese coast guard
Saturday, March 09, 2013
The "real" Chinese Coast Guard is finally here.
Well, this has finally happened, the newly reorganized State Oceanic
Administration will take command four of the five maritime law
enforcement agencies in the form of the newly established Coast Guard
Bureau.
CMS, FLEC, CCG, and Customs will all be under the command
of this new bureau, which
Thứ Ba, 12 tháng 3, 2013
Photo of the day: Liaoning, Anti-submarine platform
Monday, January 02, 2012
It is a " localizated" RBU-6000 Smerch-2 ASR, naturally
Since there is no record of a RBU-6000 sale to the PRC.
Russian RBU-6000 Smerch-2 ASR
Chủ Nhật, 10 tháng 3, 2013
J-31 may become China's next generation carrier-borne fighter jet
This is not news per se but confirmation from an "official" source is always welcome. We at China Defense.com and many others have suspected that the J-31 is to be a carrier-borne fighter from day one.
AutoCorrect, fail.
The J-15, nicknamed "lying shark", is China's
first generation of carrier-borne fighter jet.
J-31 may become China's next generation carrier-borne fighter jet(
AutoCorrect, fail.
The J-15, nicknamed "lying shark", is China's
first generation of carrier-borne fighter jet.
J-31 may become China's next generation carrier-borne fighter jet(
Thứ Bảy, 9 tháng 3, 2013
The "real" Chinese Coast Guard is finally here.
Well, this has finally happened, the newly reorganized State Oceanic
Administration will take command four of the five maritime law
enforcement agencies in the form of the newly established Coast Guard
Bureau.CMS, FLEC, CCG, and Customs will all be under the command
of this new bureau, which the Ministry of Public Security will provide
professional consultation.
-- hmmwv
Photo of the day: Good bye, Railways Ministry.
Thursday, January 21, 2010
The decommissioned PLA Railway Engineering Corps.
As China unveils the world's fastest high speed train and its French designed railway terminals. (here), perhaps it is time to look back at PLA's long forgotten Railway Engineering Corps (REC).
The Wuhan Terminal
The REC was commissioned in August 1948 and
Photos of the day: “Peace-13” multinational maritime joint military exercise starts in Pakistan
It is interesting to see “Harbin” DDG is paring up with F22P FFG of the Pakistan Navy
Thứ Sáu, 8 tháng 3, 2013
Fact check, please.
Just in case you're wondering why this blog refuses to become a news aggregator for other defense sites. Well, here is a good explanation:
Are you kidding me?
Meanwhile, China has also decided
to add three aircraft carriers by 2016. While one of the carriers,
Varyag, was announced by China last year, Beijing is also refitting two
aircraft carriers bought from Russia six years back.
Indian
Are you kidding me?
Meanwhile, China has also decided
to add three aircraft carriers by 2016. While one of the carriers,
Varyag, was announced by China last year, Beijing is also refitting two
aircraft carriers bought from Russia six years back.
Indian
Thứ Năm, 7 tháng 3, 2013
Wanted, long range MPA
Until the new MA60 MPA enters service, the PLAN will continue to rely on their B-6 bombers for long range patrols over the South China Sea. A role that the Chinese Tu-16 is clearly ill-suited for,
Bombers cruising in South China Sea(Source: China Military Online) 2013-03-07Recently, a bomber regiment of the aviation force under the South China Sea Fleet of the Navy of the Chinese People
Bombers cruising in South China Sea(Source: China Military Online) 2013-03-07Recently, a bomber regiment of the aviation force under the South China Sea Fleet of the Navy of the Chinese People
Thứ Ba, 5 tháng 3, 2013
Thứ Hai, 4 tháng 3, 2013
Chinese 55mm DP-65 remotely controlled antidiversion grenade launching system spotted
on one of those South China Sea Garrisons. Besides its antidiversion role, I think it is also a perfectly fine fishing tool.
The 55mm DP-65 remotely controlled antidiversion grenade launching system
is designed for protection of ships against attacks of underwater
combat swimmers at external roadstead open anchor stops and bases, for
protection against attacks of underwater combat
The 55mm DP-65 remotely controlled antidiversion grenade launching system
is designed for protection of ships against attacks of underwater
combat swimmers at external roadstead open anchor stops and bases, for
protection against attacks of underwater combat
Thứ Bảy, 2 tháng 3, 2013
A little write up on 056
I did a little write up today for Type 056 and here it is.
The first 056 class No. 582 was officially handed over to PLAN on the 25th of February as Wu Shengli, Commander of PLAN personally came to inspect the ship. While it is referred to as light frigate by Chinese news, it really should be classified as a corvette or OPV based on its size and displacements. This class is expected to be the next mass produced PLAN shipping class.
The type 056 class fills the gap between the 4000-ton 054A class frigate and 220-ton 022 class FAC. As of now, at least 9 other 056s have already been launched by the 4 shipyards building them. The overall number of this class is expected to be between the final count of 054A (probably around 20) and 022 (around 80). They are expected to replace the 10 Type 053 class Jianghu frigates currently serving in the South China Sea Patrol flotilla and the close to 50 Type 037 class missile boats.
In many ways, the type 056 hull is based on the Pattani class OPV that China built for Thailand from 2005 to 2006, although more signature reduction work is done such as the shielding of the funnels. Currently, 056 is equipped with 4 YJ-83s and AK-176M for ASuW missions along with a 8-cell HQ-10, AK-176M and two automated new single 30-mm barrel CIWS for self defense. Although the first few ships are not fitted with Towed Array sonar, it could provide some support for near sea ASW missions with a helipad large enough to hold Z-9C (and possibly Z-15 in the future), appearance of bow sonar bulb and 6 torpedo tubes installed in what looked to be the hangar. Most likely, the earliest 056 units will be used to replace Type 037s in the Hong Kong garrison and green water patrol missions. I expect a good number of Type 056 to eventually be used to patrol the disputed areas in South China Sea. Compared to the ships it is replacing, Type 056 requires 1/3 of the crew size of Jianghu class while offering more punch and similar endurance. Compared to Type 037, it should have better endurance, seakeeping and far stronger ASuW and AAW capabilities. It should be able to handle the naval threats from neighboring countries like Vietnam, Phillipines and Thailand. The goal is to free up larger ships like the Type 054A class and Type 052C/D class for blue water missions. In the future, I could also see ASW variants of Type 056 replacing the Type 037 sub chasers and more dedicated patrol versions of Type 056 with hangar large enough to hold 2 S-100 size UAVs.
The first 056 class No. 582 was officially handed over to PLAN on the 25th of February as Wu Shengli, Commander of PLAN personally came to inspect the ship. While it is referred to as light frigate by Chinese news, it really should be classified as a corvette or OPV based on its size and displacements. This class is expected to be the next mass produced PLAN shipping class.
The type 056 class fills the gap between the 4000-ton 054A class frigate and 220-ton 022 class FAC. As of now, at least 9 other 056s have already been launched by the 4 shipyards building them. The overall number of this class is expected to be between the final count of 054A (probably around 20) and 022 (around 80). They are expected to replace the 10 Type 053 class Jianghu frigates currently serving in the South China Sea Patrol flotilla and the close to 50 Type 037 class missile boats.
In many ways, the type 056 hull is based on the Pattani class OPV that China built for Thailand from 2005 to 2006, although more signature reduction work is done such as the shielding of the funnels. Currently, 056 is equipped with 4 YJ-83s and AK-176M for ASuW missions along with a 8-cell HQ-10, AK-176M and two automated new single 30-mm barrel CIWS for self defense. Although the first few ships are not fitted with Towed Array sonar, it could provide some support for near sea ASW missions with a helipad large enough to hold Z-9C (and possibly Z-15 in the future), appearance of bow sonar bulb and 6 torpedo tubes installed in what looked to be the hangar. Most likely, the earliest 056 units will be used to replace Type 037s in the Hong Kong garrison and green water patrol missions. I expect a good number of Type 056 to eventually be used to patrol the disputed areas in South China Sea. Compared to the ships it is replacing, Type 056 requires 1/3 of the crew size of Jianghu class while offering more punch and similar endurance. Compared to Type 037, it should have better endurance, seakeeping and far stronger ASuW and AAW capabilities. It should be able to handle the naval threats from neighboring countries like Vietnam, Phillipines and Thailand. The goal is to free up larger ships like the Type 054A class and Type 052C/D class for blue water missions. In the future, I could also see ASW variants of Type 056 replacing the Type 037 sub chasers and more dedicated patrol versions of Type 056 with hangar large enough to hold 2 S-100 size UAVs.
Đăng ký:
Bài đăng (Atom)